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COPYRIGHT AND OPEN ACCESS FOR ACADEMIC WORKS
FRANK MÜLLER-LANGER AND RICHARD WATT
Abstract. In a recent paper, Prof. Steven Shavell (see Shavell, 2009) has
argued strongly in favor of eliminating copyright from academic works. Based
upon solid economic arguments, Shavell analyses the pros and cons of removal
of copyright and in its place to have a pure open access system, in which au-
thors (or more likely their employers) would provide the funds that keep jour-
nals in business. In this paper we explore some of the arguments in Shavell’s
paper, above all the way in which the distribution of the sources of journal
revenue would be altered, and the feasible eﬀects upon the quality of journal
content. We propose a slight modification to a pure open access system which
may provide for the best of both the copyright and open access worlds.
1. Introduction
Very recently, Steven Shavell has proposed that it may be socially eﬃcient to
abolish copyright in scientific works (see Shavell 2009). The basic intuition behind
Shavell’s idea is not diﬃcult to grasp. As a group, the scientific community pro-
vides both the supply and the demand for scientific research, and the professional
publishers are an outside “third party” that simply filters the research in terms of
quality and organises it into convenient packages, which it then sells back to the
scientific community in the form of journals. The existence of copyright on scien-
tific works allows journal publishers to earn significant profits, for what appears
to be an activity that can just as well be done within the scientific community
itself. Indeed, not only is the supply of the principal ingredient to journals, namely
academic articles, provided for by the scientific community, but typically so is the
task of filtering (i.e. refereeing) the articles for quality, editorship tasks, and even
(for some cases) the typesetting task (see Hilty 2006).
The essence of Shavell’s argument is that if copyright were to be abolished, then
journal content would become perfectly competitively supplied, and so subscription
prices would drop to marginal cost (which, in the case of online access, is basically
0). Thus, under a no-copyright regime we would expect to get maximal diﬀusion of
scientific work, clearly a socially beneficial outcome. However, we must also ensure
that removal of copyright does not interfere with the supply of scientific work, and
here Shavell appeals to the fact that most, in fact nearly all, of academic writing is
not carried out for direct financial gain, but rather for the indirect gains that accrue
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to successful authors through scholarly esteem and professional advancement. Since
authors of scientific works do not typically supply their eﬀorts in response to a
financial motivation based upon copyright, the removal of copyright should not in
principle interfere with the supply of scientific research eﬀorts. Of course, however,
this depends critically on the continued existence of some organised form of journals,
which still face the task of quality control of what is published, and the distribution
of the articles in a convenient package. Since there are some costs involved in doing
this, Shavell proposes that these costs might be better borne by the authors of the
accepted papers, or perhaps more specifically by the employers of these authors,
rather than by the money that is currently gathered by subscriptions.
The proposal put forward by Shavell is meritorious, and certainly warrants care-
ful thought and analysis. The basic intuition of Shavell’s paper depends upon
certain critical assumptions made in an elegant but simple model of journal pub-
lishing. The main assumptions in the model, in order to generate the final result,
are that
(1) Authors are diﬀerentiated with respect to their preferences on how much
readership they get for their articles. “Scholarly esteem” is assumed to be
proxied by the amount of readership alone.1
(2) Journal publishers would earn zero profits in a world without copyright on
the information that they publish, and
(3) The quality and nature of scientific output does not depend upon whether
journals are financed by subscription fees in a world with copyright or by
author fees in a world without copyright.
Assumption 1 is important as a simplifying device in the model. Nevertheless, it
is surely inaccurate as a reflection of reality, and here we shall attempt to look at
other options that might be more appropriate as the relationship between “esteem”
and readership. Assumption 2 is not really needed in the model, and again might
well be debatable. But if it were true that in absence of copyright journals are
restricted to 0 profits, then clear social benefits are available if a non-copyright
based system can be devised in which journal output continues to be supplied. The
extent to which the profits that journals can earn are dependent or not on copyright
in the papers that they publish does not really condition the intuition that society
might be better oﬀ under a regime of no copyright as compared to a regime of
copyright.
However, it is probably worthwhile to point out that, as Shavell stresses, the
organisation of the journal market under a regime of no copyright would be in
1Actually, it would make no diﬀerence at all if esteem, which is what authors really care about,
were to be a function of readership, so long as the function were strictly increasing for all values
of readership.
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terms of open access and authors paying for publication costs. Since this is a
feasible business model even in a regime with copyright, but journal publishers are
(in general) reluctant to use such a model, we can probably safely assume that the
profits available to a journal publisher under an open access business model are
certainly less than under a traditional subscriptions based business model. So long
as the two options for production and distribution of journal content were to result
in the same content2 (as Shavell seems to assume), then clearly the open access
model implies a transfer of social surplus to the scientific community and away
from the publishing companies.
In this paper, we shall re-consider some of the modelling assumptions in the
Shavell paper, above all to investigate whether or not the intuition favouring elim-
ination of copyright might be aﬀected by the use of alternative assumptions.
2. Effects of Removal of Copyrights
2.1. Creation of a NewMarket. Perhaps the most important of the assumptions
made in the Shavell analysis is that, under a regime of no copyright, journals will
earn no profit. As mentioned above, the assumption as such is not really necessary
for the final conclusion to hold (i.e. removal of copyright might still be socially
valuable even if journal publishers could retain profit in a no copyright regime),
however it is certainly important for us to consider the relationship between the
profits of journal publishers and the existence or not of copyright in the content
they publish.
In the current regime, journal publishers demand copyright from the authors of
the papers that they publish, and this then allows them to hold a monopoly on
the publication and distribution of the papers that they accept to publish. In turn,
this allows the journal publishers to charge an access fee for the content of their
journals, normally in the form of a subscription fee for the receipt of all content
of a given journal for a specified length of time. The point to note here is that,
since a positive fee, over and above marginal access cost, is charged for access
to the content, standard economics then says that this content is accessed to a
socially ineﬃcient level. The basic economics of copyright is willing to put up with
this ineﬃciency in return for an incentive to provide the content in the first place.
However, the authors themselves are not (normally) remunerated directly from the
subscription fees, and so might still supply the content in some form or another
without copyright. The ability to earn a profit is only needed for the distributor —
the journal publisher — to participate, not for the content to be produced. So, the
principal question to address is whether or not a diﬀerent business model can be
proposed such that (a) the content is still produced by authors, (b) the content is
2On this point, see McCabe and Snyder (2005).
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still made available in a convenient package, and (c) the content is distributed to
the same or greater extent than under the current copyright regime. The argument
of Shavell is that, since there would be no copyright to assign to a journal, then
assuming the journal content is still produced, packaged and made available, it will
be much more widely accessed than under a copyright regime. So criterion (c) is
very likely to be satisfied. Second, since authors are not remunerated anyway, and
so their incentives do not appear to be related directly to copyright, criterion (a) is
also likely to be satisfied under a regime of no copyright. The critical point then is
criterion (b).
The open access model proposes that journal content will still be made available
in convenient packages (i.e. journal issues) so long as the costs of doing so can be
recovered. Thus, if those costs are recovered from authors, or their employers, then
there is no reason to suppose that the content will not be continued to be oﬀered
in the same, or at least very similar, packages. However, the point that we would
like to stress here is that, even in the absence of copyright, journal publishers may
still retain some degree of market power, and this may well influence the content
that is made available.
Shavell’s assumption that authors are interested in “readership” is convenient,
and to a certain degree realistic. But it does not capture the real essence of what
authors are interested in, or indeed the true relationship between specific journals
and readership. If the pure count of the number of readers were in reality the only
thing that authors were interested in, one might expect that they might favour
simply uploading their papers to their own websites and allowing free access to
them. Reliable counts could be kept of the number of downloads. Indeed, this
actually does take place on websites such as SSRN, to which authors can upload
content which becomes freely available should this be the author’s preference. Why
then would authors submit to journals? The reason is the following. Acceptance at
a given journal gives the paper a stamp of quality that cannot be easily replicated by
download counts of a voluntarily uploaded paper. The implied quality endorsement
oﬀered by journal publishing is likely far and away more important than a simple
readership count as an incentive for scientific authorship. To illustrate, say an
author had a given paper, and he could either have it published by journal A which
has a known low subscriber base (perhaps it has a very high subscription price) but
a very high academic esteem (perhaps because the acceptance standard is so high),
or journal B with a lower perceived academic esteem but higher subscriber base.
Almost without doubt, the author would choose the more esteemed journal to the
greater read one, since this will be a more impressive CV inclusion, and would thus
be a more important determinant for job promotions, wage increases, etc.
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The point here is that not only is “readership” important, but so is some form
of quality adjusted readership. Those few readers of a very highly esteemed journal
are much more valuable than are the many readers of a journal with lower academic
esteem. And if this is true, then authors will have a greater willingness to pay to
get their papers published in high esteem journals than in low esteem journals.
Given that, the question then becomes whether or not journal esteem itself de-
pends in some way upon copyright. For if it does not, then even in absence of
copyright, high esteem journals can demand submission and publication fees from
authors that are greater than the administrative and production costs implied.
That is, high esteem journals might still be able to make a profit, and perhaps a
good profit, in absence of copyright.
In reality, a switch from using subscribers to using authors as a base for gener-
ating revenue requires comparing the demand curve for content of potential sub-
scribers with the demand curve for journal space of potential authors. Again, while
it is not clear which might be the more lucrative demand curve to work with, it is
certainly relevant that in the current copyright regime, many journals (indeed, most
journals, and certainly almost all top-tier journals) clearly consider that the sub-
scriber based model is the more lucrative. However, it is also relevant that journals
that currently work on the basis of subscribers for revenue generation do not also
normally tap into the demand of authors for journal space, by charging a positive
publication fee as well as the subscription fee. There appears to be no reason why
both sources of revenue could not be used. Since authors are not charged for publi-
cation, we should perhaps understand that the quality (and perhaps the quantity)
of papers that are oﬀered to a given journal would be altered by the imposition of
a publication fee. After all, journals do compete for papers, just as they compete
for subscribers. The current business model works by making submission and, in
the contingency of acceptance, publication largely free of charge, thereby allowing
a journal the greatest possible set of papers to choose from. Charging publication
fees does not work in a copyright regime as it has the potential to seriously hamper
the supply of the essential factor for journals to survive in the subscription market.
But this would all change if the subscription market were to disappear with
the elimination of copyright in scientific work. If all journals had to charge for
publication, then the only bases upon which they would compete is the price charged
for publishing and the perceived esteem gained from publishing in each particular
journal. In such a world, it would still be expected that there would be diﬀerential
esteem perceptions over journals, and thus diﬀerential publication fee schedules,
and therefore, a clear ability for profit in some journals.
McCabe and Snyder (2005) provide an interesting analysis of the possible rela-
tionship between open access and academic journal quality. The main thrust of
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the argument is that, if journals do charge for publication, then they might accept
papers for publication that they otherwise would not, simply in order to get the
publication fee. In as far as doing so reduces the perceived quality of the journal,
and if the publication fee is in fact an increasing function of the quality of the jour-
nal, then the optimal strategy would equate at the margin the benefit of publishing
a paper (the fee thereby earned) with the costs of doing so (the reduction in the
fee that can be charged to all accepted papers). McCabe and Snyder show that an
appropriate division of author fees between submission and acceptance mitigates
the problem of the possible quality degradation of open access journals.3
In short, it is important to fully consider how the journal production and distri-
bution model aﬀects the actual content that they provide. If both forms of business
model (subscriber based and open access) were to provide the same content, then
elimination of copyright might well be the more favourable option. But if the
content of journals would suﬀer from a universal movement to open access, then
the recommendation for elimination of copyright on scientific works becomes much
weaker.
2.1.1. Hard-print versus online. Another possible problem facing the argument of
elimination of copyright is the question of how journal content would be provided
— will hard print survive, or will the only form of distribution be online? The argu-
ments in Shavell, and indeed in most of the literature on open access journals, tends
to suggest that under the open access business model the only form of production
would be online. That is, hard-print of journals would disappear in a purely open
access world. Indeed, the very essence of the social gains that are available under
an open access model of journal distribution lie in online distribution, with the cor-
responding marginal access cost of zero. Thus, as we can see in the current world,
open access journals are (almost always) purely online, with hard-print journals
only in the subscriber market. However, what would happen if all journals were
made to be open access by an elimination of copyright in the material they publish?
If there were no copyright, then clearly it is true that any competing supplier
can simply take the articles published by a first publisher, and re-package and
re-supply them. In a purely online world, the cost of taking the papers for re-
publication is zero, and indeed the costs of re-packaging and re-supplying is also
virtually zero. Thus, by making the initial content available as online digital files,
the first publisher necessarily makes life cheap for any possible competitor. Might
it not be the case then that if there were no copyright in journal material the initial
publishers might avoid online publication outright, in favour of hard-print only? In
3In a related paper, McCabe and Snyder (2006) show that both open access and subscriber based
business models can emerge as equilibrium configurations. Thus, it is not true that one is always
necessarily better than the other in any well defined sense.
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a hard-print world, it becomes costly to copy and re-package, and yet the output
can be made available to readers at a price only equal to marginal cost, since there
is no copyright. Any fixed costs of publication faced by competing publishers could
not be recovered. Thus, if the initial publisher were to move oﬄine, charging the
costs of publication to authors, then it is not at all clear that the journal market
would indeed become perfectly competitive. Indeed, so long as the initial publisher
were to sell the hard-print journals at a price that is equal to the marginal cost of
reproduction, then there is no reason why a subscriber base should not exist, as
copying would be ruinous.4 Then, the only costs that would need to be recovered
from authors are the fixed costs of publication, although of course, higher quality
journals might be able to demand an even higher publication fee.
Such a scenario would be rather disastrous in terms of social welfare. The princi-
pal benefit lies in online access of journal content, not in moving back to hard-print
only. In order that the elimination of copyright be socially beneficial, we require
that online access not be hampered. Thus it is necessary to ensure that, should
copyright be eliminated, the publishers will not revert back to hard-print only in
order to secure a market advantage. To the extent that publication costs for hard-
print are higher than for online, if publishers were to revert back to hard-print in
order to attempt to retain their market position, then the elimination of copyright
would in fact be a social drain.
2.2. Eﬀects on Universities.
2.2.1. Impact of Open Access on Highly-ranked Economics Departments. In this
section we shall address the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Universal open access may be detrimental to highly-ranked Eco-
nomics departments.
The intuition behind this proposition is the following. On the one hand, within
a copyright regime with subscription fees for academic journals, economics depart-
ments are likely to subscribe for the same standard set of highly-ranked economic
journals, such as the American Economic Review, Econometrica, or the Quarterly
Journal of Economics. Furthermore, the subscription fees for these journals will
typically not depend on the number of publications made by authors aﬃliated with
a certain department. Hence, the costs of access to academic information are likely
to be the same for each department for a given set of journals. On the other hand,
within an open access regime the costs of access to academic information would be
lower as compared to the copyright regime. For instance, assume access costs to
4It is also true that in a hard-print only world the initial publisher enjoys a first mover advantage,
since copying from hard-print is not only financially costly, but it is also time-costly.
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academic information to be zero as subscription fees drop to zero.5 However, total
costs of publication for a given department i increase if the number of publications
by authors aﬃliated with department i increases.6 This suggests that economics
departments that are highly-ranked with respect to the number of publications by
authors aﬃliated with the department benefit less from an open access regime than
lower-ranked departments.7 In fact, depending on the publication price p and the
number of publications ai an open access regime may even be detrimental to a
highly-ranked department i. However, there may also be a suﬃciently low publi-
cation price p∗i for which ceteris paribus economics department i will be indiﬀerent
between the open access and the copyright regime. Note that for p∗i +ε department
i will prefer the copyright regime over the open access regime.
Consider a world with D economics departments i. Furthermore, consider a
given set of top academic economics journals, concretely American Economic Re-
view, Econometrica, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Journal of Political Economy,
Review of Economic Studies, International Economic Review, Journal of Economic
Theory, and Review of Economics and Statistics. Let s denote the average institu-
tional annual print subscription plus an electronic site license per journal under a
copyright regime. Furthermore, let SP denote the total institutional annual print
subscription plus an electronic site license and SE the total institutional annual
electronic site license without a print subscription. We assume that each economics
department i has subscribed to each of the n journals. bai denotes the total number
of publications by authors aﬃliated with department i. Furthermore, let ai denote
the number of publications by authors aﬃliated with department i adjusted for
co-authorship.
Figure 1 illustrates and compares the copyright scenario with the open access
scenario for the case of 5 hypothetical economics departments. We assume revenue
neutrality, that is total revenue R generated by the publishers under copyright
equals total revenue under open access. For a given average subscription fee s each
economics department has total subscription costs of ns (as given by the dotted
horizontal line in Figure 1) in a world with copyright. In contrast, under open
access, total publication costs of department i depend on the number of adjusted
publications, ai, and the publication fee p. More specifically, for a given publication
fee p department i has total publication costs of pai as shown in Figure 1.
To illustrate, Department 1 which is assumed to have the highest number of
publications by aﬃliated authors adjusted for co-authorship will have the highest
5We assume that submission fees for authors are the same under both scenarios.
6We assume that co-authors equally share the publication fee if a joint paper is published.
7So far, we have not considered the positive reputation eﬀects on a department that typically
increase if the number of publications by authors aﬃliated with the department increases.
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Figure 1. Comparison of Copyright with Subscription Fees and
Open Access with Publication Fees for 5 Economics Departments
under Revenue Neutrality of Publishers
54 FRANK MÜLLER-LANGER AND RICHARD WATT
total publication costs under an open access regime as given by pa1 on the vertical
axis.
Under copyright, the publishers’ total revenue equals 5ns in this example. Under
open access, total revenue is given by
P5
i=1 pai for a given publication fee p. Graph-
ically, total revenue under open access is given by the sum of the grey-shaded areas
A, B, C, D, and E in Figure 1. Furthermore, p∗i on the horizontal axis denotes
the cut-oﬀ price for which ceteris paribus economics department i is indiﬀerent be-
tween the open access and the copyright regime, that is p∗i ai = ns. For instance, the
highest-ranked department in terms of adjusted number of publications, Depart-
ment 1, is indiﬀerent between the two regimes at a relatively low price, p∗1, whereas
the lowest-ranked department, that is Department 5, is indiﬀerent between the two
regimes at a relatively high price, p∗5.
2.2.2. Empirical Evidence. Table 1 provides information with respect to the insti-
tutional annual subscription fees of eight top-ranked economics journals.8
Table 1: Institutional Annual Subscription Fees, 2009, in US $
print plus site license site license only
American Economic Review9 120 95
Econometrica 550 500
International Economic Review 525 478
Journal of Economic Theory 8,528 5,405
Journal of Political Economy 1,050 934
Quarterly Journal of Economics 508 457
Review of Economics and Statistics 445 400
Review of Economic Studies 460 418
Total 12, 186 8, 687
Table 2 provides data with respect to the number of publications in eight top-
ranked economics journals by authors aﬃliated with the economics department of
a selection10 of the leading 186 institutions based on Heck et al. (2009),11 who
gathered data from the eight top-ranked economics journals — as shown in Table 1
— with respect to authorship of articles published from 1991 to 2005. Furthermore,
8We obtained the information from the journals’ websites.
9An American Economic Association (AEA) membership includes subscriptions to 7 journals
including the American Economic Review. The total annual subscription fee for the seven AEA
journals is $420 (only print subscription), $840 (print subscription plus an electronic site license),
and $665 (electronic site license without a print subscription), respectively.
10The full list of 186 institutions is available from the authors by request.
11See Rupp and McKinney (2002). See also Kalaitzidakis, Stengos and Mamuneas (2003) for a
worldwide ranking of economics journals and institutions. See also Coupé (2003).
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Heck et al. (2009) provide a ranking that adjusts for co-authorship originating from
diﬀerent institutions.12
Table 2: Publications of Academic Institutions in 8 Top Economics Journals
(1991 to 2005), total of 517 institutions.
Rank Institution Adjusted appearances ai Cut-oﬀ publication fee p∗i
1 Harvard 168.70 72.23
2 Chicago 151.08 80.66
3 MIT 132.62 91.89
4 Northwestern 123.17 98.94
5 Penn 121.82 100.03
6 Princeton 106.83 114.07
7 UC Berkeley 103.62 117.60
8 Stanford 95.25 127.94
9 NYU 89.50 136.16
10 Yale 77.95 156.33
11 Michigan 61.25 198.96
12 Wisconsin 60.95 199.93
13 UCLA 60.42 201.69
14 Columbia 56.92 214.09
15 Minnesota 50.87 239.55
16 LSE 49.50 246.18
17 UC San Diego 47.37 257.25
18 Cornell 46.12 264.22
19 Boston U. 46.03 264.74
20 Brown 45.92 265.37
50 UC Davis 22.50 541.60
75 Tokyo 12.83 949.81
100 VPI 8.92 1,366.68
150 South Carolina 4.83 2,522.98
186 Clark 2.20 5,539.09
331 institutions with less than 6 publications (2.20 adjusted appearances)
Source: Heck, Zaleski and Dressler (2009), Table 1, p. 2192ﬀ, and own data and
calculations
Figure 2 shows the cut-oﬀ publication fees for a selection of 186 universities
whose aﬃliated academics published at least 6 articles (unadjusted count) in the
12In contrast to Heck et al. (2009), we rank institutions according to the adjusted number of
appearances. Furthermore, we added the cut-oﬀ publication fees for adjusted and unadjusted
count.
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Figure 2. Cut-oﬀ Publication Fees for 186 Universities
top eight economics journals from 1991 to 2005. We obtain the cut-oﬀ publication
fee for institution i in the case of print subscription plus an electronic site license
and adjusted count as:
p∗i =
SP
ai
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where SP = 12, 186 is the institutional annual print subscription plus an electronic
site license in US$ as given by Table 1. Let p denote the actual publication fee
charged by open access journals.13 If p = p∗i , department i will ceteris paribus
be indiﬀerent between an open access regime and the current copyright regime
with subscription fees. If, however, p > p∗i (p < p∗i ), department i will prefer
the copyright regime (open access regime) over the open access regime (copyright
regime). Nevertheless, note that Table 2 shows the cut-oﬀ publication fees only for
institutions whose aﬃliated academics published at least 6 articles in the top-tier
journals. For the other 331 universities with less than 6 publications the cut-oﬀ
publication fee will be even higher than $5,539.09.
Figure 2 shows the cut-oﬀ publication fees for 186 universities whose aﬃliated
academics have at least authored six papers in one or more of the top-tier economics
journals, i.e. at least 2.20 adjusted counts. To illustrate, the top university in
terms of adjusted counts is indiﬀerent between copyright and open access at a
publication fee of $72.23 per publication. Nevertheless, note that for 331 universities
— alongside the 186 universities shown in Figure 2 — the unadjusted number of
appearances is less than six publications. However, if these universities were also
taken into consideration, the general intuition would be the same but the cut-oﬀ
publication fee for the least-productive university in terms of publications will be
significantly higher. For instance, assume that the adjusted number of appearances
for the least-productive university were to be 1.0. Then the cut-oﬀ publication fee
would be $12,186. Notably, an open access regime is likely to be beneficial for all
other institutions that consume information from academic journals but are likely
not to publish at all in those journals, such as industrial organizations, or some
governmental as well as non-governmental agencies.
However, according to King and Alvarado-Albertorio (2008), Table 7, p. 264,
publication fees for authors charged by major open access journals range from
$1,250 to $3,000 per article.14 For instance, assume that the constant publication
price is p1 = 1, 250. In this case, the top 95 universities - as given by Table 2 and
ranked by adjusted number of appearances — would be worse oﬀ within an open
access regime whereas 422 universities would prefer an open access regime over
the current copyright regime with subscription fees. Furthermore, for p2 = 2, 000
(p3 = 3, 000), an open access regime would be detrimental to the top 128 (159)
universities and beneficial to the 389 (358) other universities.
However, let us now analyze the distribution of publication output in more de-
tail. Figure 3 suggests that the share of the top institution on overall publication
13Here, we assume that open access journals charge the same publication fee. As an idea for
further research we suggest to analyze the case of heterogeneous open access journals in terms of
publication fees.
14See also Shavell (2009) on p. 23.
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Figure 3. Share of Top Institutions on Overall Publication Out-
put of 186 Institutions
Figure 4. Lorenz Curve for Publication Output (186 Universities,
adjusted counts)
output — as measured by both adjusted counts as well as unadjusted counts — is
approximately the same. Figure 3 also suggests a relatively unequal distribution of
publication output. By analyzing the Lorenz curve15 and by calculating the Gini
coeﬃcient16 we can address this issue.
In particular, Figure 4 shows the Lorenz curve for publication output — as mea-
sured by adjusted number of appearances — of 186 universities in 1991—2005. Let
15See Lorenz (1905).
16See Gini (1921). See also Gastwirth (1972).
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Figure 5. Lorenz Curve for Publication Output (517 Universities,
Unadjusted Counts)
us now measure the distribution of publication output by calculating the Gini co-
eﬃcient. Recall that the Gini coeﬃcient can range from 0 to 1. In our case, a Gini
coeﬃcient of 0 would correspond to perfect equality in terms of publication output
as measured by adjusted number of appearances on the one hand. In particular,
a Gini coeﬃcient of 0 would indicate that the percentage of the total publication
output would be the same for each economics department. On the other hand, a
Gini coeﬃcient of 1 would correspond to perfect inequality in terms of publication
output as measured by adjusted number of appearances. In other words, the per-
centage of the total publication output for one department would be 100 percent
whereas 185 other departments would not contribute at all to overall publications.
However, we obtain a Gini coeﬃcient of G186 = 0.56 in this case. This result sug-
gests a relatively high inequality in terms of publication output as measured by
adjusted number of appearances. As we will see in the following, this inequality is
even stronger if we analyze the publication output of 517 universities in 1991—2005
which is depicted in Figure 5.
More specifically, Figure 5 shows the Lorenz curve for publication output — as
measured by unadjusted number of appearances17 — of 517 universities in 1991—
2005. The corresponding Gini coeﬃcient is given by G517 = 0.75 in this case. This
result suggests a very high inequality in terms of publication output as measured
by unadjusted number of appearances.
17We acknowledge that the adjusted number of appearances is a more suitable measure for pub-
lication output than the unadjusted number of appearances as co-authorship is taken into con-
sideration. Nevertheless, Figure 3 suggests that the unadjusted number of publications is a good
proxy for the adjusted number of publications when we analyze the share of universities on overall
publication output.
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2.2.3. Implications. The simple model and the preliminary empirical evidence that
we analyzed in the previous sections have some interesting implications:
Open access publishing with publication fees for authors — as compared to a
copyright regime with subscription fees — is likely to lead to diﬀerential eﬀects
over economics departments. More specifically, the lowest-ranked economics de-
partments as measured by adjusted publication counts are likely to benefit from
open access publishing with publication fees as the institutional annual subscrip-
tion fees they save under open access exceed total publication fees. In contrast, an
open access regime may be detrimental to highly-ranked economics departments as
total publication fees are higher than the saved total subscription fees. The high
inequality in terms of publication output — as measured by unadjusted number of
appearances and expressed by a relatively high Gini coeﬃcient — is decisive in this
respect. Stated diﬀerently, publication fees under an open access regime would
“punish” research active institutions which — under the assumption that new aca-
demic information in economic journals is socially beneficial — would clearly not
be a desirable outcome. This result suggests that one may think about alternative
pricing schemes for open access publishing alongside publication fees.
One option might be the following, based on the economics of insurance.18 In-
stead of understanding the current subscription fee as a price for readership access
to information, we can use it as a price that allows authors access to journal space.
Imagine that all journals joined together in a combined set, and the content from
those journals were oﬀered free of charge to readers. But departments are charged
to be members of an “author’s union” or “mutual”, where membership of the mu-
tual allows free access to publication space in the set of journals, subject of course
to the quality control of the journals themselves. In that case, we can consider
that the fee payment is a premium that is paid ex ante to a mutual organization
for full insurance against the “risk” of members of that department publishing in
the combined set of journals. The intuition behind this concept is the following.
Under this new pricing system, publishers would charge all academic institutions
an ex ante premium that insures them against the risk of paying publication fees
when papers of aﬃliated authors are published in one of their journals. Stated
diﬀerently, if an institution i pays this premium ex ante it will not have to pay
any publication fees ex post no matter how many papers of authors aﬃliated with
institution i are published, since the “risk” of having a paper accepted has been
fully insured. As compared to open access publishing with publication fees this
mechanism is likely to be beneficial for productive universities with high research
output. More specifically, assuming that all universities were charged the same ex
18For instance, see Watt (2007) who addresses the question of how the economics of insurance
could be applied to the analysis of intellectual property protection mechanisms.
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ante premium, it would lead to a cross-subsidization of productive universities by
less productive universities.
Nevertheless, the question arises as to whether both productive as well as less
productive universities would have an incentive to pay the premium and become
a member of the mutual. At a constant premium, productive universities are ben-
efited as compared to a traditional open access system in which they are charged
the full publication costs for each paper published. Un-productive universities on
the other hand are made less well oﬀ by a constant membership premium. Thus,
we might envisage that unproductive universities prefer not to become members of
the mutual, and prefer to suﬀer the risks of publication fees. If this were to happen,
then the membership fee would have to increase, leading to the withdrawl of further
less productive universities, and so on.
The easiest way to avoid that problem is simply to include a policy that no
papers from authors who do not belong to a member institution can be submitted
to any member journal. Under such a system, institutions that do not become
members would never be able to attract researchers anyway, and so it would be
logical that all institutions would become members. This is logical since currently,
all institutions do pay the subscription fee for readership access to journal content,
and the only reason why they would do that is to favor the research outputs of their
researchers (since access to published articles is clearly a strong input to research
activity). Thus there is no reason to suppose that they would not continue to
pay the same fee, albeit now an access to publishing fee rather than an access to
readership fee, for what is essentially the same outcome.
If that is so, then the membership premium could remain at the level of the
current subscription fee, leaving no member institution either better or worse oﬀ
in the publication phase. The combined set of journals would also be indiﬀerent,
as it would receive the same revenue (although there might be some diﬀerences in
opinion between them as to how this revenue should be distributed among them).
Of course, the fee could also be set somewhat lower, depending on how the journal
mutual is set up, but clearly any reduction in the overall revenue received by the
journals is simply a transfer from them to the set of institutions that oﬀer authors
and that read journal content. In short, a publishing access fee that is less than
the current readership subscription fee would imply a direct reduction in journal
profit, and a direct benefit in the same amount to the institutions paying the fee.
Even if membership of the mutual were not taken as being a necessary condition
for submission of a paper to a journal, and so some universities might prefer to
save on the insurance premium and run with the individual risk of publication, the
fee set for publication in such an instance can always be set such that the mutual
members are not adversely aﬀected by the publication of the paper in question.
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It is also true that the free-rider problem that could emerge in such a scenario is
mitigated to a certain extent by the fact that even low productivity universities
benefit from reading high quality journal content. If they were to free ride, by
not becoming a member of the publication mutual and yet continuing to read
the journals free of charge, they should understand that the quality and quantity
of papers that they have access to might be diminished. Stated diﬀerently, less
productive universities would have an incentive to pay the premium and to cross-
subsidize the more productive universities as they benefit from their research eﬀorts
and thus have an incentive to avoid the breakdown of the market for journals.
To sum up, under the assumption that publishers charge universities an average
premium under open access publishing that equals the average subscription fee
under a copyright regime, publishers are likely to make the same profit under both
scenarios if the free riding problem mentioned above can be successfully mitigated.
Finally, in contrast to open access publishing with ex post publication fees, the
insurance mutual system would not reduce the incentives of productive universities
to produce new academic information. It would rather increase their incentives to
publish at the margin, as it reduces the marginal publication cost to zero.
3. Conclusion and Ideas for further Research
We re-consider some of the modelling assumptions in the Shavell paper in order
to analyze the question as to whether or not the intuition favouring elimination of
copyright might be aﬀected by the use of alternative assumptions.
First, Shavell’s assumption that “scholarly esteem” is proxied by the amount of
readership alone might well be debatable. More specifically, exposure and not the
amount of readership alone appears to be a good proxy for scholarly esteem. To
illustrate, an author who may publish a paper either in an esteemed journal with
relatively few readers or in a less esteemed journal but with a greater read would
tend to choose the more esteemed journal to the greater read one. This will be a
more impressive CV inclusion, and would thus be a more important determinant
for job promotions, wage increases, etc. We therefore suggest extending Shavell’s
model in this respect by analyzing the impact of quality-adjusted readership on
scholarly esteem.
Second, we propose to address the question as to whether journal esteem depends
in some way upon copyright. For instance, assume that the elimination of copyright
has a negative impact on journal esteem as McCabe and Snyder (2005) suggest. In
this case, we would have to consider this negative eﬀect on publishers, scholars, and
academic institutions when analyzing the question as to whether the abolishment
of copyright would be socially optimal.
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Both aspects the impact of quality-adjusted readership on scholarly esteem as
well as the impact of copyright on journal esteem may have important welfare im-
plications. To give an example, Shavell suggests that the abolishment of copyright
— under the assumption that academics do not have to bear publication fees but the
institutions they are aﬃliated with — should augment incentives to publish articles
because “readership of articles would grow in the absence of copyright, and thus
the esteem that authors would derive from publication would tend to increase” (See
Shavell, 2009, p. 3). However, this result might not necessarily be true for the fol-
lowing reason. For instance, consider the (allegedly) extreme case that readership
of an article grows whereas quality-adjusted readership decreases in the absence of
copyright. Furthermore, suppose that journal esteem decreases in the absence of
copyright. In contrast to Shavell’s result mentioned above, the esteem that scholars
would derive from publication would rather tend to decrease in this case. Thus,
the elimination of copyright may reduce the incentives to publish in this extreme
scenario.
Another possible problem facing the argument of elimination of copyright is the
question of whether — as most of the literature on open access suggests19 — under
the open access business model the only form of production would be online. Stated
diﬀerently, would hard-print of journals disappear in a purely open access world?
More specifically, initial journal publishers may have an incentive to move oﬄine
in a copyright-free world in order to secure a market advantage by increasing re-
publication cost of competing suppliers of scientific content. As such a scenario
would be rather disastrous in terms of social welfare we require that online access
not be hampered in a copyright-free world.
Furthermore, our analysis suggests that universal open access — at least in eco-
nomics — may be detrimental to research institutions that have a relatively high
publication output as total publication fees are likely to be higher than the saved
total subscription fees. A high inequality in terms of publication output is decisive
in this respect. As publication fees under an open access regime would “punish”
research active institutions we suggest analyzing alternative pricing schemes for
open access publishing alongside publication fees. More specifically, we propose a
new pricing system based on the economics of insurance. Under this pricing scheme
publishers would charge all academic institutions an ex ante premium that insures
them against the risk of paying publication fees when papers of aﬃliated authors
are published in one of their journals.
Finally, our empirical analysis is so far limited to a set of eight top-tier journals
and one academic discipline (economics). We, therefore, suggest extending the
19Shavell, for instance, implicitly assumes an “unfettered access to academic works” in a copyright-
free world (Shavell 2009, p. 4).
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empirical analysis in two ways: First, one may empirically analyze publication
output and authorship patterns in a larger set of economics journals. Second, one
may also take into consideration a larger set of academic disciplines.
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